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 The Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) was established in 1993. The CPD came into being 
as a civil society initiative to promote an ongoing dialogue between the principal partners in 
the decision-making and implementing process. The dialogues are designed to address 
important policy issues and to seek constructive solutions to these problems. The Centre has 
organised a series of such dialogues at local, regional and national levels. The CPD has also 
organised a number of South Asian bilateral and regional dialogues as well as some 
international dialogues. These dialogues have brought together high level policy makers, 
opposition frontbenchers, Members of Parliament, leaders of trade, business and labour 
organisations, representatives of grass roots organisations and NGOs, development partners, 
professionals and other functional groups in the Bangladesh civil society within a non-
confrontational environment to promote constructive engagement and focused discussions. 
The CPD seeks to create a national policy consciousness where members of civil society will 
be made aware of critical policy issues affecting their lives and will come together in support 




Along with its dialogue programme, CPD also implements an extensive research programme. 
CPD’s research works are both serviced by and are intended to serve as inputs for dialogues 
organised by the Centre throughout the year.  Some of the major research programmes at the 
CPD include The Independent Review of Bangladesh's Development (IRBD), Trade 
Policy Analysis (TPA), Governance and Policy Reforms, Regional Cooperation and 
Integration, Investment Promotion and Enterprise Development, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Ecosystems and Environment, and Youth Development Programme. 
Young Scholars’ Seminar Series is designed for the young CPD researchers to present their 
work at the centre. The CPD also conducts periodic public perception surveys on policy 
issues and issues of developmental concerns. 
 
 
Dissemination of information and knowledge on critical developmental issues continues to 
remain an important component of CPD’s activities. Pursuant to this, CPD maintains an 
active publication programme, both in Bangla and in English. Till now, CPD has brought out 
about two hundred publications in the form of books, monographs, occasional papers and 
dialogue reports. CPD’s publications are also brought out under CPD Policy Brief Series.  As a part of its dissemination programme, the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD) brings out 
an Occasional Paper Series on a regular basis. Dialogue background papers, investigation 
reports, results of perception surveys and other outputs of studies conducted under the various 
programmes implemented at CPD are published under this series.   
 
The present paper titled WTO General Council Decision of July 31, 2004: Interpreting from 
Bangladesh Perspective was prepared under the CPD’s Trade Policy Analysis (TPA) 
programme.  The TPA programme of CPD was initiated in 1999 in response to a felt need to 
enhance Bangladesh’s capacity to more effectively deal with the emerging trade issues in the 
face of deregulation, liberalisation and globalisation. The successful completion of the 
Uruguay Round Agreement in 1994 and the establishment of the WTO in 1995 was expected 
to have crucial implications for the LDCs such as Bangladesh. In the 1990s Bangladesh 
economy was becoming increasingly open and trade related policy making and trade 
negotiations were assuming critical importance for Bangladesh’s future development.  
 
In view of the emerging challenges in the context of the ongoing process of globalisation, the 
objective of CPD’s Trade Policy Analysis programme is to monitor the impact of the 
evolving trading regime under the WTO on Bangladesh economy with a view to support 
trade related capacity building process in the country by strengthening CPD’s institutional 
capacity in the areas of (a) trade related research, (b) preparation of policy briefs, (c) 
organisation of dialogues, (d) organisation of workshop and training, (e) strengthening trade 
related documentation, and (f) trade related publication and networking.  
 
The present paper on WTO General Council Decision of July 31, 2004: Interpreting from 
Bangladesh Perspective has been prepared by Professor Mustafizur Rahman, Research 
Director of CPD and Dr. Ananya Raihan, Research Fellow of CPD. The paper looks at the 
salient features of July 31 text, identification of departure of it from the Cancun draft text 
(progression or regression) from an LDC perspective and to put forward some suggestions as 
regards issues which Bangladesh could pursue in the course of future negotiations in the run 
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The Doha Development Round (DDR) suffered a major setback when the fifth 
Cancun Ministerial Meeting of the WTO failed to hammer a Ministerial Declaration. 
Fortunately, the DDR could be put back on track, thanks to the July 31 decision of the 
147 member states of the WTO General Council. The July decision has given a 
breathing space to the DDR agenda, not least because it has extended the dead-line for 
negotiations under the DDR work plan from the previously decided Jan, 2005 to the 
end of 2005. The July text is also important since it provides a framework on the basis 
of which future negotiations will take place. The text provides a road map for working 
with a foreseeable negotiating horizon. The July package provides the broad 
principles for continuing the work on liberalizing agricultural trade, industrial tariffs, 
services and other areas, however, negotiators must now reach specific agreements on 
where and by how much farm subsidies and tariffs must be cut, and markets opened.   
 
The present Policy Brief has three objectives: (a) to articulate what are the salient 
features of July 31 text, (b) to identify the points of departure from the Cancun draft 
text (progression or regression) from an LDC perspective and (c) to put forward some 
suggestions as regards issues which Bangladesh could pursue in the course of future 
negotiations in the run up to the Sixth Ministerial Meeting to be held in Hong Kong 
by the end of 2005.  
 
SECTION I.       BACKGROUND OF JULY 31 MEETING: DOHA 
                            DEVELOPMENT ROUND IS BACK ON TRACK             
 
Developments since Cancun 
Cancun was a setback for all countries. All members thought that there will be no 
repetition of Seattle, and the good beginning of Doha will be continued. After the 
initial shock following Cancun, there was a concerted effort to get the ball rolling thee 
again. Following Cancun, in order to restart the stalled talk, the WTO General 
Council set on with the task of searching for negotiating frameworks for the 
implementation of the DDR agenda. Because of the lack of any progress from the 
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“informal consultations”, held during October – December 2003, no new text could be 
agreed upon which could push forward the issues over which the Cancun Ministerial 
Conference collapsed before arriving at an agreed Declaration. 
As was expected, the last meeting of the General Council of the WTO in 2003—held 
on 15th and 16th December in Geneva—took no substantive decisions. Instead, 
members took account of consultations held over the preceding few months and 
agreed to re-establish the trade negotiation bodies “as soon as possible”. The 
Chairman of the GC Carlos Perez del Castillo, in his statement, summarised the major 
outcomes of the consultations carried out since Cancun. These concentrated on four 
issues. He identified these as (a) agriculture (which was the most controversial), (b) 
non-agricultural market access, (c) Singapore Issues and (d) the Cotton Initiative. The 
only decision taken was to re-establish the trade negotiating bodies in the TNC, and 
its various subgroups, in early 2004. The General Council Chair tentatively concluded 
that negotiations could perhaps be initiated on trade facilitation, the least controversial 
of the four Singapore issues. He, however, mentioned that nothing has been formally 
agreed. 
 
A number of WTO members and WTO Director General Supachai continued their 
efforts to restart trade talks during Christmas and New Year 2004. The World 
Economic Forum in Davos, held in January, 2004, provided an opportunity for a 
Mini-Ministerial  meeting.  Among other issues, consultations were held for 
appointment of new chairpersons for the GC and the trade negotiating bodies.  
In its meeting of February 11, 2004 the WTO General Council approved a slate of 
new Chairs for the WTO’s subsidiary and negotiating bodies; however, because of 
continuing disagreement among the Members on how to treat the Singapore Issues, no 
Chair was appointed for the working groups on investment, competition policy and 
transparency in government procurement.  
 
At the GC meeting held on 17-18 May, 2004, the Director General of the WTO 
acknowledged the importance of the discussions which took place in Paris (Informal 
WTO Ministers’ Meeting in Paris – 14 May 2004). The LDC Ministerial meeting in 
Senegal was also an important development during this period. The meeting 
articulated LDC priorities and drew attention of other members of the WTO to the 
urgent need to address LDC concerns. The Director General noted that the political 
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impetus given to the Round in the recent weeks including the Paris meetings, the 
Fischler/Lamy exchange of letter and the meeting of LDC Ministers were crucial in 
giving impetus to the Geneva process and in obtaining concrete outcomes at the 
multilateral level. A decision was taken during the General Council meeting in May, 
2004 that an effective framework package would be agreed upon by the end of July, 
2004 in order that the negotiations could proceed to their next stage.  
 
Towards The July 31 Draft: The Process 
The first draft of the July package came out only on 16 July, 2004. There was not 
enough time, before the General Council meeting, for the member countries to 
respond since many of these were not part of the “Green Room Consultations”. The 
delegations of LDCs and other developing countries in Geneva should have had 
enough time to study the text, to consult among themselves and with likeminded 
delegations, and finally, to receive approval from their respective Capitals. 
Unfortunately, because of the looming deadline, this was not possible. The meeting of 
the General Council commenced on 27 July and was planned to end either on 29, or 
latest on 30 July 2004. Drawing on the Green Room Consultations, the first revision 
of the “July 31 Text” came only on July 30 morning. The informal meeting of the 
heads of delegation was held at 10 am on the same day to discuss the text, allowing 
hardly any time to study it properly or to consult their capitals, or to propose 
amendments. It was a repeat of the Cancun situation: “take it or leave it”. 
Considerable pressure was put on some of the developing countries whose rigidity 
was perceived as the major stumbling block towards a consensus. Once again the 
multilateral system epitomized by the Geneva consultations was on the brink of 
failure. Western media blamed some of the developing countries for possible failure 
and accusing them of hurting, in the first place, the interest of the poorer developing 
countries. Apart from the “blame" factor, various groups of developing countries also 
felt that they were getting at least a minimum of what they were asking for, even 
though they had to give up the ground in some of the other areas. There was simply 
no time for most of the developing countries to seriously consider the drafts and the 
final text. Most importantly also, the majority of trade Ministers from developing 
countries were not present in Geneva whereas Ministers of many of the developed 
countries were indeed present in Geneva. For the developed countries the General 
WTO General Council Decision of July 31, 2004  3CPD Occasional paper series 46 
Council meeting turned out to be a “Mini-Ministerial” of sorts. The decision making 
power of the developed countries was once again manifested in Geneva.  
Under these circumstances, delegations of the developing countries were under 
considerable pressure to lend their support to the draft text. The final draft of July 31 
package came out in the afternoon of the day and a meeting was held to adopt it that 
very night. The framework for future negotiations was thus agreed upon. To be true, 
what happened is that the WTO members agreed to start negotiations on possible 
Agreement, rather than reaching any negotiated Agreement. Consequently, the results 
achieved remained fragile, and divergence of opinion may yet crop up once again 
during the negotiations on actual modalities of liberalization.  
The July 31 Draft: The Content 
By the end of the deadline set for July 31, 2004 negotiating countries in Geneva were 
able to thrash out a deal for going ahead with the stalled negotiations under the Doha 
Development Round. This agreed package of framework is titled “Doha Work 
Programme: Draft General Council Decision of July 31, 2004”. Since no Ministerial 
Declaration for guiding the Doha Round negotiations could be adopted in Cancun, 
this framework agreement is likely to serve as the guide line for moving the 
negotiations forward in Geneva. It is, however, to be kept in mind that this framework 
is not a final agreement. Under the framework agreement on agriculture and NAMA, 
the next phase will focus on finalising the "modalities" (principles and magnitudes, 
for example, on how much tariff to be reduced). 
The framework agreement is being seen as an important breakthrough in the deadlock 
experienced during the Cancun Ministerial Meeting. The progress made in terms of 
(a) agriculture, (b) non-agricultural market access, (c) development issues and (d) 
trade facilitation, under the framework agreement of July 31, 2004, is expected to 
provide some measures of momentum to work of WTO members’ in other important 
areas of negotiations including rules, services, environment, reform of dispute 
settlement procedures and intellectual property protection. 
One important development is that the duration of the Doha Development Round 
(DDR) has been extended up to December, 2005 from the earlier determined limit. 
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Thus the DDR negotiations will now continue till January 1, 2005. The Sixth 
Ministerial Meeting is to be held in Hong Kong, China in December, 2005. Some of 
the other deadlines have also been extended hoping to conclude the DDR.  
The deadline for recommendations on special and differential treatment has been 
moved to July 2005. The deadline for placing revised and improved market opening 
offers for trading in services has also been extended to May  2005. A report on 
Implementation Issues will be prepared and presented to the Trade Negotiations 
Committee (TNC) and the General Council (GC) by May,  2005 for necessary 
measures to be taken by the Council by July 2005. 
Substantive Negotiations were to be initiated in September, 2004.  
 
SECTION II.  UNFOLDING THE JULY PACKAGE: WHAT IS THERE FOR 
BANGLADESH 
July Package: Salient Features 
Agriculture: An outline of agricultural trade negotiations has been developed in the 
July Package. The text is a compromise variant that attempts to reconcile the 
formidable conflicting interests of the USA, EU and the G-20 which include such 
important developing country members as China, India, Brazil and some of the other 
farm goods exporting counties. However, detailed and comprehensive modalities for 
negotiations in Agriculture are yet to be developed in the next phase. These agreed 
modalities will then be placed before the next WTO Ministerial meeting for approval. 
For the first time, the July text incorporates specific commitment for elimination of 
export subsidies [paragraph 18]. However, there is no time frame or road map for 
such elimination. It needs to be appreciated that the inclusion of a commitment by the 
developed countries to do away with export subsidies is a major achievement of the 
July General Council Meeting. Under this commitment, export credits, export credit 
guarantees or insurance programmes with repayment periods beyond 180 days will 
also be eliminated; at the same time those of 180 days and below will be disciplined. 
When the elimination of subsidies takes place, this will get rid of a few of the most 
trade distorting subsidies which had enabled the dumping of agriculture exports from 
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rich countries, and had unfairly kept out farm products originating in the developing 
countries from the international market.  
Singapore Issues: As far as developing countries and the LDCs are concerned, the 
most important achievement of the July package is that three of the four "Singapore 
Issues" (investment, competition policy, and transparency in government 
procurement) were dropped from the WTO's negotiating agenda, at least for the 
duration of the DDR.
1 Only the issue of Trade Facilitation (TF) will now be 
discussed as part of the DDR work plan. The attempt by the rich countries to also 
include the other three issues was a major factor behind the Cancun debacle. The 
formulation in the July text, however, leaves room for these issues to make a 
comeback as negotiating topics once the Doha programme is over. Nevertheless, 
relief from the burden of negotiations regarding these three Singapore issues at least 
for the time being is an achievement for Bangladesh and other least-developed 
countries. They have been fighting all through for exclusion of these issues from DDR 
agenda and this was also articulated during the Senegal LDC meeting. 
Regress in July Package 
Agriculture: The positive impacts of the July package which concern export 
subsidies under the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) could be offset if subsidies in the 
so-called “second pillar”, domestic support, is not adequately curbed, or what is 
worse, allowed to increase. Small farmers in developing countries could be further 
marginalized because of continuing domestic support in developed countries because 
of weak competitive strength with subsidised imports. In this context, the outcome in 
the domestic support and market access pillars was not to the satisfaction of 
developing countries and potentially damaging. Importantly, the relatively more 
transparent formulation as regards liberalisation of trade in agriculture which was set 
out in the draft Cancun declaration, was somewhat blurred in the July text.  
Meaningful reform in agriculture appears to have been undermined in the July text. 
Changes within the Blue Box relating to allowable areas for the purpose of domestic 
support point more towards a shift in allowable subsidies, rather than a reduction. The 
                                                           
1 The decision says "no work towards negotiations on any of these issues will take place within the 
WTO during the Doha Round."[paragraph 1g]. 
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text will permit the developed countries to protect sensitive products while not 
providing enough options to the developing countries to protect sectors of their 
agriculture system which are essential for food security. By expanding the Blue Box 
and insisting on increased market access for most products without sufficient 
protection for crops necessary for food security, the framework has the potential to 
enhance scope for dumping which has caused significant damage to farmers around 
the world. Apparently, the July draft will allow the developed countries to window-
dress their domestic support measures.  
Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA): Perhaps the compromise over 
agriculture and Singapore Issues was somewhat offset by what developing countries 
were expected to undertake under the AMA. To some extent this was because of 
application of "non-linear" formula of tariff reduction which is aggressive for its 
sharply reducing tariffs, with steeper cuts for higher tariffs. For example, under a 
variation of this formula, a 40% tariff on a product would have to be reduced to 7%. 
To estimate the new bound rates, the applied tariff rates of the presently unbound 
products will be considered, and this will be multiplied by two (this figure is 
mentioned within brackets) and then subjected to the non-linear formula. In this case, 
the new bound rates may end up significantly lower than the present applied rates. 
The gap between applied and bound rates will be narrowed significantly; this gap 
generally provides some flexibility by way of a "safety zone" whereby the developing 
countries can choose to raise the applied rates towards the bound rate in the event of 
serious difficulties arising from import competition. This flexibility will now be 
substantially squeezed.  
The provision for fast-track elimination of tariff for sectoral tariff component 
[paragraph 7], which is implied to be compulsory, will put the domestic industries at 
risks once they are selected for tariff reduction in the course of subsequent 
negotiations.   
Services: The services text appears to be very general. Although the number of 
annexes in Cancun draft was seven, there was no separate annex on Services. This 
time the July text does include such an Annex, although it does not reflect the nitty-
gritty of negotiations on services. As a matter of fact, GATS issues did not receive 
due priority in the DDR Agenda and suffered as a result of wrong sequencing and 
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missed deadlines. The offer-request negotiations had been launched before the 
completion of rule making negotiations, violating the guidelines for GATS 
negotiations. The deadlines for both offers and requests were missed by many 
countries. Only 30 countries made offers within June 30, 2002, the stipulated 
deadline. Assessment of liberalisation in services had not been accomplished, which 
also was a prerequisite for initiating the offer-request negotiations. Although the 
Annex includes a paragraph on rule making negotiations, there is no roadmap for 
completion of these negotiations on fast track basis.  
 
The overall impression that one gets by going through the Annex is that no significant 
progress is expected before the Sixth Ministerial Meeting. It is expected that the 
upcoming negotiations will be highly concentrated on agriculture and NAMA. The 
draft emphasises on submission of initial offers by the Members who are yet to make 
one.  
 
The new deadline of May 2005 was fixed without any discussion, at the very end of 
the GC Meeting of July 31, 2004. It was not clear whether the given time frame will 
be adequate for the member countries most of which are developing that don’t have 
the requisite capacity to assess the implications of opening their services sectors. 
 
Cotton Issue: The inclusion of cotton as part of the agricultural negotiations may be 
considered as progress. Mention may be made here that this was excluded from 
negotiations during the Uruguay Round, where all fibres were excluded from the 
purview of the agreement. Nevertheless, this inclusion virtually excludes the cotton 
issue from a fast track resolution and by the time the cotton subsidies are expected to 
be eliminated under the general liberalisation formula, the African cotton producers 
may as well became an extinct category because of the existing market distortions.  
New Elements in DDR 
Trade Facilitation (TF) is the only new item which was included in the negotiations 
based on the explicit consensus in the General Council Meeting of July 2004. 
Inclusion of TF was a compromise between developed and developing countries: 
developed countries insisted that at the least this one issue of the four Singapore 
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issues be included in the agenda; the developing countries had to swallow this as a 
compromise variant in lieu of excluding the other three Singapore Issues. 
 
The negotiations modalities on TF described in the July text was more elaborate than 
those were in the Cancun draft. When the developing and least-developed countries 
expressed their intention to accept one of the four Singapore Issues, presumably the 
TF was the issue that was in the back of their minds. However, the developing and 
least-developed countries raised a set of specific concerns related to their 
implementation capacity emanating from the obligations. Bangladesh submitted a 
proposal on behalf of core group on TF. A number of the provisions of that proposal 
have been reflected in the July 16, 2004 draft and subsequently in the final July 
framework text.  
 
The negotiations modalities did not elaborate on the core issues of “further expediting 
the movement, release and clearance of goods” and clarification of Article V, VII and 
X of GATT 1994, rather 8 out of 10 paragraphs of the Annex D on TF focus on 
various issues of derogation and technical assistance to be provided by the developed 
countries to the developing and least-developed countries. From developing world 
perspective, the text seems to be very friendly; however, it is still not clear what 
actual modalities will be discussed during the negotiations.  
 
Developing countries were apprehensive that new customs rules could impose an 
entirely new layer of technological infrastructure for tracking and inspection, even 
though they hardly had the adequate resources to cover the attendant costs. As the 
developed countries are pledging "aid" to developing countries to build the new 
infrastructure, it appears that this will give some of their corporations an opportunity 
to earn a lot of money. 
 
 
SECTION III.    JULY PACKAGE: IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIES  
      FOR   BANGLADESH 
Implications of the July Package for Bangladesh 
Agriculture: The July text exempts Bangladesh, as an LDC, from undertaking any 
reduction commitments in agriculture. However, in terms of getting duty-free and 
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quota-free market access, the July text is more regressive than the Cancun draft text. 
The formulation in Cancun draft text was as follows: 
Developed countries [should][shall] provide  duty-free and quota-free market access 
for products originating from least developed countries. 
On the other hand, the July text refers to the issue in the following way: 
Developed country Members, and developing country Members in a opposition to do 
so, should provide duty-free and quota-free market access for products originating 
from least developed countries.  
The delegations from the LDCs got little opportunity to raise this issue due to the 
limitation in time and scope to enter the Green Room discussions.  
 
The progressive liberalisation in export competition and market access pillars has dual 
implications for Bangladesh. In the short run, Bangladeshi agricultural products will 
be more competitive in the global market because of the reduction in tariff and export 
subsidies. In the long run, Bangladesh may benefit from cheaper import of products 
which are not cost effective to produce domestically. To realise this benefit, active 
government support will be required to promote agricultural export.  
 
If the Cancun text on agriculture was kept intact with additional amendments on 
export subsidy components, this would perhaps be the best possible outcome for most 
of the developing and least developed countries.  
Non-Agricultural Market Access: The July text related to the LDCs as regards 
NAMA is exactly the same as it was in the Cancun text. As an LDC Bangladesh will 
not have to apply the formula or sectoral approach in tariff reduction. However, the 
text expresses “expectation” of developed and developing country Members from the 
LDCs to take higher level of binding commitments which essentially, in all 
likelihood, will put pressure on the LDCs to further reduce tariff over the subsequent 
period.  
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The duty-free and quota-free market access for the LDCs for non-agricultural 
products has not received the support the LDCs expected in the text.  
A trade-off where the issue of duty-free market access is exchanged for undertaking 
some explicit commitments under the NAMA may as well be an option for 
Bangladesh, particularly in view of Bangladesh’s already liberalised trading regime. 
Services: The services text appears to be very general. The text gives an impression 
of a lack of adequate attention to the concerns of the developing and least-developed 
countries. As against this, the services text in the Cancun draft appears to have been 
more carefully crafted.  
 
Overall, it appears that the Cancun text was significantly better than the July text as 
regards promoting the LDCs’ interest in services sector. The Cancun text mentioned, 
“In services, we shall give priority to the sectors and modes of supply of export 
interest to LDCs, particularly in regard to movement of service providers under mode 
4.” However, the July text does not have anything specific or explicit as regards the 
LDCs.  
 
Trade Facilitation: Although the negotiations are to be confined within Articles V, 
VII and X of GATT 1994 for further clarification and improvement, the new 
framework is likely to capture other aspects [paragraph 9]. As happened in case of 
TRIPS, which had an initially innocuous negotiating mandate, and subsequently 
became a major concern for developing countries and LDCs, there is a tendency to 
broaden the mandate once an issue has been included for negotiations. As Article V is 
related to freedom of transit¸ transit among Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan may 
turn into an important issue for the South Asian region to be debated in the WTO. 
However, how ‘transit’ is defined, is also likely to became a contested issue.  
 
From LDC perspective “one size fits all” approach is not the best possible solution as 
far as their customs harmonisation rules are concerned. As the LDCs would need to 
maintain high standards of trade facilitation, which will involve costly adjustments, 
such an approach will be unfair for these countries. Moreover, the structure and 
functions in the customs procedures are not uniform across countries. The attendant 
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disciplines may also constrain trading capacities of LDCs and many as well serve as 
protectionist tools by some non-LDCs. 
 
Making TF regulations “least trade restrictive” could also lead to negative/downward 
harmonisation of border controls, in some instances making it difficult for a country 
to implement more stringent controls, e.g. in the name of safety. 
 
It is doubtful that the developed countries will be able to provide adequate financing 
to cover the trade facilitation related expenses in LDCs, given the current state of aid 
flow, technical assistance and the experience with building a WTO Trust Fund to help 
LDCs and developing countries. 
 
Strategies for Bangladesh 
Agriculture: It is clear that the negotiations under the new framework will not be 
able to reduce trade-distorting domestic support within a short period of time. Thus, 
Bangladesh may call for incorporation, in the agreement, of an article on 
compensation for those LDCs, which are negatively affected due to the subsidies, till 
the time these are phased out.  
Majority of the LDCs are dependent on agriculture both for export and subsistence. 
Many countries will not be able to take advantage of potential preferential market 
access to the developed countries. Bangladesh should call for initiation of a 
programme to support the enhancement of supply side capacities in the agricultural 
sector so as to enable the LDCs to take full advantage of market access opportunities  
The July text did not include the demand of the LDCs to exercise the right to use 
additional duties based on a simple countervailing measure on subsidised imports, 
until trade distorting support is effectively eliminated. Bangladesh should demand for 
inclusion of such provision in the outcome of the negotiations.  
NAMA: One of the priority demands of LDCs was putting moratorium on anti-
dumping and countervailing duty on the products originating form the LDCs. This 
was particularly important for apparels, in view of the uncertainties in the context of 
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MFA phase out. This issue was not addressed in the draft text. Bangladesh should 
demand inclusion of a binding text on this in the modalities of negotiations. 
 
Yet another demand for granting non-reciprocal credit for autonomous liberalisation, 
particularly advanced by Bangladesh, was not addressed in July text. There was some 
reference to this in the Cancun draft. Bangladesh should raise the issue in the Geneva 
negotiations as regards granting of non-reciprocal credit for autonomous liberalisation 
undertaken prior to 1995 by LDCs such as Bangladesh.  
 
The Cancun text included issue of flexible rules of origin in Article 26 of the draft, in 
a manner which did not ensure commercially meaningful market access for the LDCs. 
The July text was silent on this issue. Bangladesh should argue for rules of origin 
(ROO) that takes into account supply side capacities of the LDCs. 
 
Services: For developing future negotiating stance in services negotiations, the point 
of departure for Bangladesh is the special modalities for LDCs, which provided some 
encouragement to the LDCs. It addressed one of the pre-conditions for initiating the 
offer-request negotiations. The modalities were the outcome of persistent demand of 
the LDCs over the last few years. It is interesting to note that the LDC modalities in 
the text had in many places incorporated, verbatim, the text of the Dhaka Declaration 
of the LDC Ministers held in June, 2003. Out of 20 demands of the LDC Ministerial 
14 demands were met through the special modalities, albeit with various degrees of 
ambiguity and clarity. Active role of Bangladesh in finalisation of special modalities 
was well appreciated. The language of the text uses “shall”, which ensures binding 
nature of obligations under the modalities. However, without commensurate DSU 
provisions, the “shall” provision may also prove to be useless. It is the first time that 
in the text on modalities “serious difficulties” of LDCs in undertaking special 
commitments, and lack of institutional and human capacities to analyse and respond 
to offers and requests, have been given due recognition. It was also recognised that 
trade in services plays important role in addressing poverty, upgrading welfare, 
improving universal availability and access to basic services. LDCs should endeavour 
to promote this message in future GATS negotiations. 
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The achievements of the LDCs in terms of accommodation of some key demands in 
the special modalities are presented in the table 1. 
TABLE 1.  ACHIEVEMENT IN LDC MODALITIES FOR GATS NEGOTIATIONS
2
Sl. Unconditional  Conditional 
1 Members…  shall  exercise 
restraint in seeking 
commitments from LDCs due 
to achieving the objectives of 
Art. IV  
LDCs shall not be expected to offer full NT, 
nor are they expected to undertake additional 
commitments under Article XVIII of the 
GATS on regulatory issues which may go 
beyond their institutional, regulatory, and 
administrative capacities 
Alternative text: Members shall not demand 
full NT and additional commitments from 
LDCs 
2  Flexibility to LDCs for opening 
few sectors, liberalising fewer 
types of transactions  
In response to requests, LDCs may make 
commitments compatible with their 
development, trade and financial needs and 
which are limited in terms of sectors, modes 
of supply and scope.  
Alternative text: LDCs shall have flexibility 
to make…  
3  In addition, Members shall 
refrain from requesting credits 
for autonomous liberalization 
from LDCs.  
 
Members shall [Articles IV and XIX] give 
special priority to providing effective market 
access in sectors and modes of supply of 
export interest to LDCs, through negotiated 
specific commitments pursuant to Parts III 
and IV of the GATS.  
Proposal: Omit italic text [should be 
provided multilaterally] 
4  Technical assistance shall also 
be provided to LDCs to carry 
out national assessments of 
trade in services in overall 
terms and on a sectoral basis  
 
Members shall take measures, in accordance 
with their individual capacities, aimed at 
increasing the participation of LDCs in trade 
in services.  
Proposal: Capacity in terms of % of GDP 
5    LDCs shall be granted appropriate credit for 
their autonomous trade liberalization.  
6   It  is  recognized  that the temporary 
movement of natural persons supplying 
services (Mode 4) provides potential benefits 
to the sending and recipient Members. LDCs 
have indicated that this is one of the most 
important means of supplying services 
internationally. Members shall to the extent 
                                                           
2 The table has been taken from the CPD publications titled Bangladesh’s Strategies for Post 
Cancun Negotiations, Occasional Paper No. 28, 2003.  
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Sl. Unconditional  Conditional 
possible, and consistently with Article XIX 
of the GATS, consider undertaking 
commitments to provide access in mode 4, 
taking into account all categories of natural 
persons identified by LDCs in their requests. 
Proposal: Omit italic underlined text. Adopt 
ISCO-88 Classification of Occupation as the 
basis of inclusion 
7    Targeted and coordinated technical 
assistance and capacity building programmes 
shall continue … 
Proposal: …programmes shall be 
introduced… 
 
In the upcoming negotiations on GATS Bangladesh should play an active role to 
ensure that the special modalities become part of the single undertaking.  
 
However, the special modalities have left the following issues which will need to be 
addressed before full-fledged negotiations are initiated: 
•  Assessment of Services Liberalisation: Article 6 of the draft Cancun 
declaration included text on assessment of impact of services liberalisation. 
Bangladesh should propose the following changes: “We call upon CTS to put 
in place mechanisms for assessment of impact of services liberalisation before 
starting the negotiations within  […]. We call upon those participants who 
have not yet submitted their initial offers to do so as soon as possible. 
Improved offers should be submitted by [the date mentioned in the bracket 
above]”.   
•  Completion of Rules Making Negotiations 
  Preference for Domestic Companies in Government Procurement 
  LDCs should be allowed to provide subsidies to nascent services 
industries  
•  Completion of ESM Negotiations 
  Bangladesh should also propose the following change in the Article 6: 
“We recognise the development implications of the mode 4 market 
access and shall provide priority to the negotiations on mode 4 and 
other sectors of interest for the developing countries”.  
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  The inclusion of text on interest of the developing countries in mode 4 
has been nullified by the following text: “In accordance with GATS 
provisions, there shall be due respect for the right of Members to 
regulate and to introduce new regulations in pursuance of national 
policy objectives”. This should be deleted. 
  In Article 26, the text on mode 4 should be revised as follows: “In 
services, we shall give priority to the sectors and modes of supply of 
export interest to the LDCs, particularly in regard to movement of 
service providers under Mode 4”. 
  For meaningful market access in mode 4, it is essential that less skilled 
categories are included in the services classification. Bangladesh 
should propose that ISCO-88 Classification of occupation should be 
adopted as a basis for negotiations on the mode 4 liberalisation.  
•  The negotiations on mode 4 should also include the discussion on elimination 
of economic needs test (ENT) and quantitative restrictions (QRs), de-linking 
of temporary movement of natural persons from commitments on commercial 
presence and introducing simplified visa schemes. 
 
Trade Facilitation: Considering the post-Cancun reality and prospect of getting 
advantage in other areas of negotiations, Bangladesh may keep the following 
perspectives in upcoming negotiations: 
 
  Negotiations must be confined to the premise of Article 1 of Annex D of the 
July text and should guarantee that the scope of negotiations will not be 
elaborated in future.  
  Special and differential treatment to LDCs should include, inter alia, at least a 
ten year period for implementation of provisions for trade facilitation.  
  Needs assessment exercise will need to be carried out with participation of the 
concerned LDCs. Negotiations should ensure that failure in compliance in the 
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Concluding Remarks 
The explicit consensus achieved by the WTO members as regards the July 31 text 
gave that multilateral trading system the much needed lease of life. It was revealed 
once again that negotiating skill and strategising is extremely important for winning 
negotiations and that in the WTO ‘countries get not what they deserve, but what they 
negotiate’. The fear of being blamed for another collapse immediately after Cancun 
led many developing countries to be extra cautious and, eventually, accept a deal of 
which they had been critical.  
In summary, one could conclude that the Geneva work programme framework text, in 
many respect, is not better, and in some instances worse than the Cancun text as far as 
interests of the LDCs are concerned. A first reading of the July text evinces a few 
gains for the developing countries and LDCs, however, this is more than offset in 
other areas where they have lost ground. Annex-A captures some of the trade-offs in a 
summarised manner. The July 31 text has failed to satisfy fully any of the interested 
blocs of members. The text appears to be the outcome of a compromise between the 
US and the EU; and the developing countries have been accorded some concessions. 
At the end of the day, the LDCs which had high hopes of getting commercially 
meaningful market access, were disappointed. However, much will depend on how 
the works of the various negotiating groups evolve in the run up to the sixth 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong which is scheduled to be held by the end of 2005. 
Bangladesh will need to proactively pursue her interests in the course of these 
negotiations. The present policy brief has identified a number of areas where 
Bangladesh could focus her attention in future negotiations in Geneva in order to 
pursue and advance LDC interests. 
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Annex – A 
A Comparative Study of Cancun and Geneva Text: Bangladesh Perspective 
  Cancun Draft  July 31 GC Text  Comments from the perspective of Bangladesh 
Agriculture Developed Country Members 
[should] [shall] provide duty-free 
and quota-free market access for 
products originating from least 
developed countries. 
 
Developed Country Members, and 
developing country Members, in a 
position to do so, should provide duty-
free and quota-free market access for 
products originating from least 
developed countries.  
Unfortunately the text has been substantially watered 
down by adding “in a position to do”. This is non-
committal and leaves room for maneuvering by the 
developed countries. The fact that LDCs got little 
opportunity to raise this issue during the Green Room 
consultations, perhaps also contributed to the insertion 
of this particular version in the text. However, having 
said that, it needs to be noted that more concerted 
pressure will need to be put in this regard, more 
specifically on the USA since its position of this issue 
will be decisive.  
NAMA  We agree that least-developed 
country participants shall not be 
required to apply the formula nor 
participate in the sectorial 
approach, however, as part of their 
contribution to this round of 
negotiations, they are expected to 
substantially increase their level of 
binding commitments. 
We agree that least-developed country 
participants shall not be required to 
apply the formula nor participate in the 
sectorial approach, however, as part of 
their contribution to this round of 
negotiations, they are expected to 
substantially increase their level of 
binding commitments. 
There is no change in the two texts. However, the 
“expectation” of developed and developing country 
Members that the LDCs need to take higher level of 
binding commitments could perhaps be referred to in 
future negotiations to put pressure on the LDCs to 
widen the ambit of their commitments. Bangladesh and 
other LDCs should be cautious as regards any such 
development.  
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  Cancun Draft  July 31 GC Text  Comments from the perspective of Bangladesh 
  Furthermore, in recognition of the 
need to enhance the integration of 
least-developed countries into the 
multilateral trading system and 
support the diversification of their 
production and export base, we 
call upon developed-country 
participants and other participants 
who so decide, to grant on an 
autonomous basis duty-free and 
quota-free market access for non-
agricultural products originating 
from least-developed countries by 
the year […]. 
Furthermore, in recognition of the need 
to enhance the integration of least-
developed countries into the 
multilateral trading system and support 
the diversification of their production 
and export base, we call upon 
developed-country participants and 
other participants, who so decide, to 
grant on an autonomous basis duty-free 
and quota-free market access for non-
agricultural products originating from 
least-developed countries by the year 
[…]. 
There is no change in the two texts. The demand of 
LDCs for duty free access for their industrial products 
was essentially ignored. Rather the July text reiterates 
the Cancun draft text and urges developed countries 
‘who so decide’ to grant duty-free access on an 
autonomous basis.  Although a deadline has been 
proposed, albeit in bracket, it appears that when read 
with ‘who so decide’, the text does not amount to much. 
The demand of a duty-free market access for non-
agricultural products on a multilateral basis, continues 
to remain unheeded by the developed country members 
in the WTO. 
  We urge Members to adopt and 
implement rules of origin so as to 
facilitate exports from LDCs. 
No text  Although the Cancun text was vague, it at least talked 
about flexibility in the ROO in view of difficulties faced 
by many LDCs. It is a regress that the July text has 
entirely ignored the issue. 
Services  In services, we shall give priority 
to the sectors and modes of supply 
of export interest to LDCs, 
particularly in regard to movement 
of service providers under Mode 4.
Members note the interest of 
developing countries, as well as other 
Members, in Mode 4. 
The July text on mode 4 has been substantially toned 
down (when compared to the Cancun draft text). This is 
against the spirit of special modalities which was 
adopted before the Cancun Ministerial. In the upcoming 
negotiations Bangladesh should refer to the special 
modalities and argue that this is a key area where 
market openings are essential in order that trade 
liberalisation negotiations are balanced (between 
liberalization of goods and services sectors) and in 




2. In the case of developing and 
least-developed countries, it is 
1. Negotiations shall aim to clarify 
and improve relevant aspects of 
Out of ten paragraphs eight are dedicated to 
clarification on derogation for the LDCs and developing 
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  Cancun Draft  July 31 GC Text  Comments from the perspective of Bangladesh 
agreed that their implementation 
capacities shall be an important 
factor to take into account in the 
negotiations. The negotiations 
shall also take fully into account 
the principle of special and 
differential treatment for 
developing and least-developed 
countries. 
3. Recognizing the needs of 
developing and least-developed 
countries for enhanced technical 
assistance and capacity building 
in this area, we commit 
ourselves to ensuring adequate 
technical assistance and support 
for capacity building both 
during the negotiations and after 
their conclusion. 
4. in order to make the process of 
identification and assessment of 
needs related to technical 
assistance and capacity building 
effective and operational and to 
ensure better coherence, a 
collaborative effort shall be 
undertaken with other international 
organizations, including the World 
Bank, IMF, UNCTAD and the 
Articles V, VIII and X of the GATT 
1994 with a view to further 
expediting the movement, release 
and clearance of goods, including 
goods in transit.
3  Negotiations 
shall also aim at enhancing 
technical assistance and support for 
capacity building in this area.  The 
negotiations shall further aim at 
provisions for effective cooperation 
between customs or any other 
appropriate authorities on trade 
facilitation and customs compliance 
issues. 
 
2.  The results of the negotiations shall 
take fully into account the principle 
of special and differential treatment 
for developing and least-developed 
countries.  Members recognize that 
this principle should extend beyond 
the granting of traditional transition 
periods for implementing 
commitments.  In particular, the 
extent and the timing of entering 
into commitments shall be related 
to the implementation capacities of 
developing and least-developed 
Members.  It is further agreed that 
countries; they also refer to technical assistance. This is 
a welcome development from Bangladesh’s 
perspective. However, it is to be noted that the 
modalities do not deal with real issues of negotiations 
on the relevant articles of GATS 1994. Although this is 
termed as modalities for TF negotiations, relevant 
points on actual negotiations have not been elaborated; 
only the issues of derogation and technical assistance 
for the LDCs are mentioned in the text. 
 
The text recognises that LDCs may face difficulty in 
undertaking any commitment with respect to TF. The 
text explicitly mentions about the need for S&D 
treatment for the LDCs. It calls upon developed country 
members to support LDC effort to improve their 
capacity in this area. 
 
Bangladesh should get on with the task of identifying 
areas where TAs are essential to enable Bangladesh to 
agree and to comply with any disciplines in the context 
of TF that is negotiated in the course of future 
negotiations. 
 
As Article V relates to freedom of transit¸ the issue of 
transit among Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan 
may turn out to be an important issue for the South 
Asian region. Bangladesh should work on articulating 
its interests in this regard. 
 
                                                           
3 It is understood that this is without prejudice to the possible format of the final result of the negotiations and would allow consideration of various forms of outcomes. 
4 In connection with this paragraph, Members note that paragraph 38 of the Doha Ministerial Declaration addresses relevant technical assistance and capacity building 
concerns of Members. 
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  Cancun Draft  July 31 GC Text  Comments from the perspective of Bangladesh 
WCO, in this regard. 
 
those Members would not be 
obliged to undertake investments in 
infrastructure projects beyond their 
means. 
 
3.     Least-developed country Members 
will only be required to undertake 
commitments to the extent 
consistent with their individual 
development, financial and trade 
needs or their administrative and 
institutional capabilities. 
 
4.  As an integral part of the 
negotiations, Members shall seek to 
identify their trade facilitation needs 
and priorities, particularly those of 
developing and least-developed 
countries, and shall also address the 
concerns of developing and least-
developed countries related to cost 
implications of proposed measures. 
 
5.  It is recognized that the provision of 
technical assistance and support for 
capacity building is vital for 
developing and least-developed 
countries to enable them to fully 
participate in and benefit from the 
negotiations.  Members, in 
particular developed countries, 
therefore commit themselves to 
The insertion in the text (paragraph 6) that ‘it is 
understood that the commitments by developed 
countries to provide such support are not open-ended’, 
has somewhat watered down the text. However, it is 
good for the LDCs that a commitment has been made in 
the text as to the effect that ‘where required support and 
assistance for such infrastructure is not forthcoming, 
and where a developing or least-developed Member 
continues to lack the necessary capacity, 
implementation will not be required’. 
 
Bangladesh should endeavour to make best use of this 
text which calls on multilateral institutions and 
organisations such as the World Bank and IMF to help 
LDCs address capacity building in TF related areas. A 
comprehensive TA needs assessment study should be 
initiated to articulate Bangladesh’s needs in the TF area. 
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  Cancun Draft  July 31 GC Text  Comments from the perspective of Bangladesh 
adequately ensure such support and 
assistance during the negotiations.
4
 
6.  Support and assistance should also 
be provided to help developing and 
least-developed countries 
implement the commitments 
resulting from the negotiations, in 
accordance with their nature and 
scope.  In this context, it is 
recognized that negotiations could 
lead to certain commitments whose 
implementation would require 
support for infrastructure 
development on the part of some 
Members.  In these limited cases, 
developed-country Members will 
make every effort to ensure support 
and assistance directly related to the 
nature and scope of the 
commitments in order to allow 
implementation.  It is understood, 
however, that in cases where 
required support and assistance for 
such infrastructure is not 
forthcoming, and where a 
developing or least-developed 
Member continues to lack the 
necessary capacity, implementation 
will not be required.  While every 
effort will be made to ensure the 
necessary support and assistance, it 
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  Cancun Draft  July 31 GC Text  Comments from the perspective of Bangladesh 
is understood that the commitments 
by developed countries to provide 
such support are not open-ended. 
 
7. Members agree to review the 
effectiveness of the support and 
assistance provided and its ability to 
support the implementation of the 
results of the negotiations. 
 
8.  In order to make technical 
assistance and capacity building 
more effective and operational and 
to ensure better coherence, 
Members shall invite relevant 
international organizations, 
including the IMF, OECD, 
UNCTAD, WCO and the World 
Bank to undertake a collaborative 
effort in this regard. 
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